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Abstract: 
Contracting for public services from public or private suppliers is now a common prescription to improve 
government efficiency. The competitive bidding model is usually viewed as the ideal contracting process. 
However, this article explains that two other approaches—the negotiation model and the cooperation model—
may be more appropriate under certain conditions. The primary factors that are likely to determine which of the 
three approaches is most suitable are (a) the characteristics of the external environment (especially the number 
of service suppliers), (b) the level of organizational resources (e.g., personnel, funds, time, and expertise), and 
(c) the degree of uncertainty about funding, future events, service technologies, and causal relationships 
between service outputs and desired outcomes. The main point is that there is no one best way to contract for 
services; rather, government units should adapt their contracting procedures to both internal external conditions 
to implement service contracting in an effective manner. 
 
Article: 
Cutting back, cutting out, and contracting out for public services have become government watchwords in the 
last decade in the face of declining federal grants, taxpayer resistance, and tax and spending limitations. Both 
scholars and practitioners have been entranced with the various methods of privatizing government goods and 
services (Bennett & Johnson, 1981; Hanke, 1987; Savas, I987; Straussman, 1981). Of the various privatization 
approaches, service contracting has been viewed as one of the most attractive quasi-market alternatives to 
traditional bureaucratic service delivery, since it has been promoted as a feasible method of reducing 
government expenditures and improving efficiency and effectiveness. As a result, much of the literature has 
focused on the advantages and disadvantages of contracting out for services (Fitch, 1974; Moe, 1987; Murin, 
1985; Savas, 1987), projected and actual cost savings (Bennett & Johnson, 198I; Poole, 1980), and the 
frequency of use in local government (Florestano & Gordon, 1980; Hatry & Valente, 1983). 
 
More recently, however, a growing body of literature has begun the task of examining contracting 
implementation itself, including contracting procedures, decision-making processes, and organizational environ-
ments (DeHoog, 1984, 1985, 1986; Ferris, 1986; Ferris & Graddy, 1986; Hunt, 1984, 1985; Schlesinger, 
Dorward, & Pulice, 1986). Not only are certain "hard" service areas, such as garbage collection, fire protection, 
and street lighting, being examined, but the "soft," more complex human services (in which people are the 
service focus) are also increasingly of interest (Kettner & Martin, 1986; Kramer & Grossman, 1987). These are 
essential areas of study, since policy analysts and public managers alike must move beyond theory and begin to 
address the key issues of implementation and management practice in various services. 
 
The decision to contract with outside firms or agencies does not necessarily trigger an automatic mechanism to 
produce lower costs and better services. The fiscal and service outcomes are, in part, influenced by the design of 
the contracting process itself and are contingent on both internal and external organizational conditions. While 
competitive bidding has become the standard approach to service contracting, I intend to show that it has 
serious drawbacks under some circumstances. 
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This article uses the findings of existing contracting cases and developing theoretical approaches to extend the 
study of contracting in two ways. First, three conditions under which some compromises in the ideal 
competitive contacting model must take place are identified, which form the basis for comparisons of the ideal 
and the two alternative models. These conditions include (a) the characteristics of the external environment —
especially the number of service suppliers; (b) the level of organizational resources (e.g., personnel, funds, time, 
and expertise) necessary to cover the many transaction costs involved in the contracting process; and (c) the 
degree of uncertainty about funding, future events, service technologies, and causal relationships between 
service outputs and desired outcomes. 
 
The growing theoretical literature on institutions found in economics and political science has suggested the 
importance of these factors in a variety of contractual relations, in terms of issues about competition, infor-
mation, transaction costs, opportunism, uncertainty, and complexity (see especially March & Olsen, 1984; Moe, 
1984; Ostrom, 1986; Shepsle, I989; Williamson, 1975, 1985). Recent works primarily by economists (e.g., 
Scharpf, 1989; Williamson, 1985) have suggested that, even in private sector exchanges, we can no longer focus 
exclusively on either the competitive market model or internal hierarchical organization for supplying services, 
but that other, more flexible forms of contracting can be viewed as appropriate compromises between the two 
extremes. 
 
Second, the traditional contracting approach—the competition model —is critiqued and then compared to two 
alternative contracting models—the negotiation and cooperation models—which are likely to be more suitable 
approaches when the conditions essential to effective implementation of the competitive model do not obtain. 
While these models are not new to service contracting, they have not been made explicit in the existing 
literature on public sector contracting nor have they been related to the supplier, organizational, and service 
conditions. The article concludes by comparing the three contracting models in light of these conditions. It also 
addresses the more general question: Why adopt contracting out as an alternative to government bureaucracy 
when the conditions do not appear to favor the competitive model? 
 
This discussion assumes that the choice of contracting out has already been made by elected or appointed 
officials, statute, or regulation, whether or not this method actually is an efficient alternative to public 
bureaucratic supply. If external supply has been selected, how might the contracting system be designed to 
promote the public agency's goals, given the nature of its external environment and its internal organizational 
and service constraints? This question recognizes that officials may not always have much of a choice in 
designing the appropriate system prior to or after a decision has been made to contract out for a particular 
service. Thus certain institutional constraints (e.g., legal restrictions) may require one type of contracting 
process. This article has, therefore, both a descriptive and prescriptive orientation. I will not only describe the 
key features of the models but will argue that governments should adapt, as much as is feasible, their 
contracting procedures to correspond to the supplier environment, contracting resources, and the degree of 
uncertainty. Public officials have often been told that the traditional competitive model is the only efficient way 
to purchase services, and many efforts in recent years have been aimed at trying to ensure more competitive 
systems. Yet the other two approaches offer advantages when the competitive model is unrealistic. My thesis is 
that there is no one best way to contract out for public services. 
 
THE CONTRACTING IDEAL: THE COMPETITION MODEL 
In the competition model of contracting out, the government has its choice among several bids and therefore can 
select the firm that will provide the specified services at the lowest cost. While this ideal is often not achieved in 
public services, useful benefits of the competition model may be approximated. Both the number of potential 
contractors (suppliers) and government agencies (buyers) is often quite small, offering less choice and 
independence than the market model envisions. In addition, actual contracting decisions are often based on 
imperfect and limited information about suppliers, probabilities of adequate service performance, the causal 
relationships between service outputs and outcomes, and suppliers' actual performance. Nonetheless, we assume 
that government officials will, as in the ideal case, attempt to maximize economic efficiency in choosing among 
potential contractors.
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 Although the level of competition and information is not ideal, certainly some degree of 
competition is assumed to generate cost reductions. In addition, as has been pointed out in the privatization 
literature (Savas, 1987), public agencies may use the private sector not only because of the potential 
competition paring costs but also due to economies of scale and scope and the circumvention of public 
personnel requirements. 
 
In its operation, then, this model seeks to promote the efficiency aims of obtaining the best quality product or 
service at the least-cost level. The emphasis is on the proper bureaucratic procedures and process, which 
include: (a) a complete specification of the required service, (b) a wide advertising and solicitation effort, (c) an 
objective award decision, and (d) objective cost- and performance-monitoring procedures. However, as we will 
see below, even when government officials adhere to these standards (which is not always the case), the 
competition model may not work as envisioned to produce high-quality services for a low cost. A fundamental 
assumption of the model is that the rules of the process and the ensuing contract will by themselves produce 
desirable outcomes. Yet in reality, under some circumstances officials will find that they cannot use this model 
easily and effectively. 
 
LIMITATIONS IN THE COMPETITION MODEL 
While it is widely recognized that the competitive approach to contracting falls far short of the "pure" market 
model, government contracting may approximate the imperfect market approach, as discussed earlier. In terms 
of the three factors already introduced and as seen in Table 1, this model is likely to be successful under the 
following conditions: (a) competition—when several responsible and responsive firms independently bid on the 
contract; (b) adequate organization resources-where the government agency and the potential suppliers have the 
time, staff, and expertise to participate effectively in the lengthy and sometimes complex contracting process, 
from early service planning to the monitoring and evaluation of services; and (c) certainty—where the 
government's funding levels, client or service needs, and service technology are relatively straightforward and 
certain. When any one of these three conditions is absent, the competitive approach may not always be 
appropriate for purchasing public services. 
 
Each of these conditions is necessary for a competitive system for different reasons. First, three or more 
potential suppliers are essential for competition. As I queried in 1984: "If no other firm exists to offer its 
services, what incentives does the single bidder have to pare costs and provide high quality services? And how 
can the purchasing unit evaluate the proposed price and services when there is no method of comparison?" (p. 
19). While government agencies have some relevant independent knowledge of suppliers and their services, 
they often rely on bidders' information to make choices, which acts as a check on opportunism. 
 
However, in certain service areas, choice among suppliers is severely limited, due to a new service, high capital 
costs, or lack of professional expertise in certain smaller communities (DeHoog, 1984, 1986; Kramer & 
Grossman, 1987). In addition, as Williamson (1985) noted, even when these problems do not exist at the outset 
of a service or project, due to asset specificity, over time, the selected contractor often develops considerable 
expertise and capital investments that will discourage other bidders and give them considerable advantage over 
competitors (as well as the government agency) in any renegotiation of the contract. The problem of "small-
numbers supply," as Williamson (1975) noted, means that the "buyer incurs the risk that the purchased product 
or service will, at some time, be supplied under monopolistic terms" (p. 52). These terms may include higher 
costs and poorer quality services because of lack of choice among bids.
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 The federal government has tried to 
stimulate (or even simulate) competition in some large defense projects where it was absent, but, as Hunt (1984) 
reported, these efforts have proved unsatisfactory. In the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health, even 
though the state tried to encourage participation, the following results of competitive bidding were 
disappointing: "On average each Request-for-Proposals (RFP) receives 1.7 responses; almost two-thirds of the 
`competitively' bid contracts had responses from only a single vendor, and only 15% had responses from more 
than two vendors" (Schlesinger et al., 1986, p. 252). 
 
Second, adequate organizational resources are necessary in the competitive model because transaction costs can 
be high (DeHoog, 1984; Sappington & Stiglitz, 1987; Williamson, 1975). To complete all steps of the 
competitive bidding process in a timely manner, the government agency must have sufficient information, 
expertise, staff, and computational ability to make a prudent contract award and then to monitor performance 
during the life of the contract. Obviously, oversight is also an essential source of evaluative information for 
contract renewal decisions and acts as a constraint on contractor opportunism. 
 
Even where several agencies are available for contracts, transaction costs can be high for clients. As Schlesinger 
et al. (1986) put it: "Effective competition depends on the potential for switching programs and clients from one 
provider to another. This ideal conflicts, however, with the goal of maintaining continuity of care" (p. 252). In 
the mental health field, as with other services, program managers may try to reduce competition and choice in 
favor of service continuity, which they prefer for the attendant avoidance of their own as well as clients' 
transaction costs. The problem is that the government's resources and client adaptability may be inadequate for 
competitive procurement to work effectively. The complexity and the legal requirements of the competitive 
process involve transaction costs of time, information, staff, funds, or expertise that are often in short supply, 
particularly in small or fiscally strained governments. 
 
Also often overlooked in discussions of contracting are the organizational resources required for the contractors 
themselves to compile proposals. Those who have had experience in bidding on government contracts may have 
a significant advantage here, as the problem of asset specificity mentioned earlier emphasizes. At least in the 
case of human services, small, new, nonprofit agencies often lack expertise and administrative resources to be 
able to compete against experienced and well- funded agencies (DeHoog, 1984; Kramer & Grossman, 1987; 
Schlesinger et al., 1986). Thus the difficulty of market entry serves to limit the availability of potential 
suppliers. 
 
The competition model also requires a complete specification of the desired service by the contracting 
government. This realistically can occur only under the third condition of certainty, when the government's 
needs are known well in advance, appropriate service technologies are understood, and funding for the service 
is secure (Hunt, 1984). Without an airtight contract including these components, determining what constitutes 
inadequate administrative or service components post hoc is almost impossible. Unfortunately, clear 
performance specifications are difficult to generate and communicate in some services, such as innovative pro-
grams, large-scale capital projects, some human, or "soft" services, or professional services (e.g., architectural, 
legal, or engineering services). If it is a new service or one with which the government agency has had no prior 
experience in supplying, this may be a particularly knotty issue, since the potential supplier may be the expert, 
not the government. Thus government agencies suffer under terms of incomplete information that are 
asymmetrically distributed to the advantage of contractors.
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Another limitation of competitive procurement is that it, like other efforts that focus on the key role of political 
institutions in structuring outcomes (March & Olsen, 1984), overemphasizes the monolithic nature of 
government bureaucracies engaged in contracting out. To understand how contracting really works, we must 
look beyond simply the stated preferences and rational choices of the organization and recognize that 
individuals and their relationships across organization boundaries also help to explain the success or failure of 
public purchasing (Cooper, 1980; DeHoog, 1986). In a similar vein, Hunt (1984) emphasized in his study of 
federal military research and development that the formal competitive model (his F-model) assumes rather 
unrealistic, inflexible roles between the government and contractors: 
 
The parties are thought of in an F-model as well-differentiated economically rational "buyers" and "sellers" engaged in ... a "discrete 
transaction." They ostensibly have no relationship apart from a simple market-regulated exchange of goods, nor either opportunity or 
need for transgression of their limited and predefined buyer-seller roles. (p. 248) 
 
Rather than focusing on joint problem solving, this impersonal, rule- driven, and sometimes adversarial 
relationship lends itself to losing sight of goals and failing to take advantage of private expertise. 
 
This competition model may also produce suboptimal outcomes because of contractor opportunism. In 
reviewing the recent literature of public choice and behavioral psychology, Mueller (1986) observed that 
experiments on human behavior indicate that opportunistic and illegal behavior is more likely to be found in 
competitive settings and that cooperative behavior is likely to be produced in cooperative settings. Thus the 
structure and rules of interaction apparently influence how humans behave. Applied to service contracting, the 
question is: How can the contracting system be designed to maximize cooperative behavior by contractors, and 
minimize opportunistic behavior? In the case of the competitive model, which is likely to bring out 
opportunistic behavior and where the stakes are often high, the system must be designed to reveal and punish 
such behavior severely enough to deter other opportunists. This approach requires resources not always 
available in government—not only resources to investigate possible violations but also the resources (including 
willingness) to prosecute and punish violators in a highly visible way. I found evidence in my (1984) research 
that "officials did not always prosecute even in clear cases of fraud because of political pressure. Instances of 
mismanagement of funds posed difficulties in recouping losses because of the expense involved and contractors' 
apparent good intentions" (p. I03). 
 
Due to the various requisite conditions and unrealistic requirements, this competitive approach is not usually 
employed in contracting out for human services, professional services, or research and development, although 
competitive bidding may be required and some of the elements of the model may be in place (DeHoog, 1984; 
Schlesinger et al., 1986). However, the competition model is often used to purchase certain "hard" services, or 
intermediate services, for which a complete RFP can be developed by public officials (because of a high degree 
of certainty), transaction costs are not high, and several potential competitors are available. 
 
TWO ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF CONTRACTING 
To this point, we have seen that the competition model is likely to be effectively implemented only under fairly 
rigorous conditions: where a strong market of service producers exists, when resources are abundant, and when 
service production is certain. When these conditions are absent, two other models might be better substitutes. 
 
Both of these alternatives assume that a key element of contracting is the relationship between the government 
officials, the "buyer" or "principal," and the usually nongovernment "seller," or agent (Williamson, 1985). The 
conditions and rules of the interaction between the two sides and the stakes, incentives, and penalties are critical 
to an analysis of what each side does and how each reacts to the other. While the public contracting or 
purchasing officers and program managers are at the center of the government procurement system, often the 
success of the system depends on their ability to balance a variety of legal, political, and organizational 
demands and constraints (Cooper, 1980; Sharkansky, I980). This means, of course, that more than just two sets 
of actors are involved in actual contracting, as a simple principal-agent analysis might imply (Moe, I984). The 
relationship between the government and the contractors is often complicated by the fact that other participants 
influence, and perhaps control, the interchange (i.e., elected officials, control agencies, citizen interest groups, 
professional associations, or other operating departments whose jurisdictions may overlap with that of the 
primary government entity). These other participants may have a variety of interests and incentives to influence 
both the design of the system and the contract awards (e.g., political ambitions, service interests, and ac-
countability concerns). The competition model fails to acknowledge these actors and the complexity that they 
introduce. 
 
THE NEGOTIATION MODEL 
A more realistic alternative to the competition model is the negotiation model. In contrast to the competitive 
market model, the negotiation model involves relational contracting, in which a form of consensual and incre-
mental decision making is the norm (Scharpf, 1989; Williamson, 1985). 
 
The Operation of the Negotiation Model 
The process of negotiation begins with an announcement of the availability of the contracts, but often without a 
full-scale search or solicitation for all possible contractors. The suppliers who are contacted are limited to 
previous contractors and possibly, to firms that have expressed an interest in obtaining a contract. Some state or 
local officials hesitate to solicit outside the jurisdiction for political reasons, such that often, only local firms or 
agencies are contacted about contracts. The desired services are not specified in very much detail, although 
certain elements that officials have made a priority are included. Because of their experience and expertise, the 
private firms or agencies have some freedom to design service plans as they see fit. They submit their proposals, 
the agency selects the preferred plan, and then the negotiations begin on specific changes (Cooper, 1980). 
 
Often the question is not so much who will be selected, since it is a foregone conclusion that the identified (or 
previous) contractors will be chosen, but rather, the central negotiating matters will be the contract price and the 
type and extent of the projects or services to be undertaken. The critical negotiation phase, which occurs after 
the contractors have been selected, focuses on general limits for service activities, administrative control 
procedures, and per-unit or total amounts that the government will pay. However, just because negotiations 
begin with a certain supplier, it is not guaranteed that a contract with that supplier will be written and signed. 
During the process, certain issues may arise in which either the contractor or the government may determine 
that an agreement cannot be reached. 
 
During the implementation of the contract, public officials must be flexible and involved in operations and 
oversight. As Hunt (1985) asserted in his work on federal program management: 
 
Managing under uncertainty calls for flexibility and judgment—problem solving—not routine performance of fixed procedures.... 
Ambiguous work statements must be clarified on the basis of shared experience and redefined as circumstances or perceptions change 
and the public's interest must be protected in the process. (p. 586) 
 
In this model, the government and the contractor are on a more equal footing than in the competition model. 
Fisher and Ury's (1981) Getting to Yes model of principled negotiation comes close to capturing the essence of 
the ideal relationship between the two parties and their efforts to produce an amicable agreement. The parties 
may see their goals and interests very differently, but they both can achieve certain advantages by a process that 
adheres to the basic ground rules of fairness, truthfulness, and reason as they seek a contract beneficial to both. 
 
In actuality public officials and contractors may act more as adversaries and may not be able to focus on 
interests instead of positions and personalities, as Fisher and Ury recommended. Yet both sides are constrained 
from leaving the negotiation process by their interest in reaching an agreement, and their lack of other 
alternatives. In many cases, the contractor may be fairly dependent on the government's funding, and the 
government dependent on the firm to supply a necessary service. Where resources are low or change rapid, the 
potential contractor has some leverage to use in its dealings with the government. However, the government 
agency has the potential of either finding/creating another supplier or producing the service itself. 
 
A brief example from my 1984 study of human services may help to clarify how the negotiation process works. 
In the state social services and employment services in Michigan, the early part of the process looked very 
similar to a block grant process, in which the state agency had a general purpose in mind, but a variety of 
different types of programs and services could be designed at different funding levels and still be accepted. 
While some competition was present, in that the service suppliers were competing for a limited pie, little direct 
competition on a serviceby-service basis was involved. Thus the state could decide to contract for several types 
of services with different suppliers who have all been notified with the same general announcement. For 
example, a county might contract out with different agencies for money management counseling, family 
counseling, and geriatric day care using the same advertisement and the same pot of funds. Furthermore, "once 
a contractor, always a contractor," could have been the motto of the social service department (DeHoog 1984, p. 
61). Usually, contractors were able to renew their contracts without direct competition. Common negotiating 
issues concerned client loads, service methods, and per-unit costs. 
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Negotiation Model 
The negotiation model offers several advantages for contracting for services. First, this model can be used in 
service areas that have few suppliers. Second, because not all of the administrative procedures for competitive 
bidding are required, the process entails lower transaction costs in terms of administrative expertise, staff time, 
information requirements, advertising, and solicitation costs. Transaction costs for negotiating contract terms 
and for monitoring and evaluation may be greater than under the competitive model, however. Because the 
contract does not clearly specify performance standards, and technologies may be poorly understood, complex, 
or rapidly changing, the government may need to devote more effort and resources to overseeing suppliers' 
actions and their outcomes. 
 
Third, this model can accommodate uncertainty and complexity by negotiating many of the details of the 
contract with suppliers in a way that allows for some flexibility should conditions change. All details of service 
delivery and technologies need not be specified in the request for proposals or advertisements. This permits 
some choice by potential contractors in designing projects and services that conform to the government's 
objectives. As the date of contract writing draws near, it may become clearer to both sides what is desirable in 
these areas, due to, for example, more information about funding, elected officials' preferences, or previous 
programs' success. While the contract may not contain all details, as in a competitively bid document, both sides 
may be able to reach an agreement about specific components that might not have been possible before. When 
negotiating with a specific contractor, government officials can take into account the suppliers' administrative, 
capital, and professional capacity in producing the desired service. This type of detail is not usually known in 
drafting the specification package. 
 
The drawback of the negotiation model is that although more flexible than the competition model, it still may 
not take full advantage of the contractor's expertise, since the government has primary control over the terms of 
the contract. This model also requires time, expertise, and staff resources in the negotiation process and 
certainly in the monitoring and oversight phase. It may emphasize the adversarial nature of the process, since it 
tends to focus on procedural matters, and less on program outcomes. Often, only the facade of competition is 
maintained for public view, but the benefits of open, explicit cooperation and authority sharing are lacking here. 
As we shall see in the next section, the cooperation model avoids most of these problems, but incurs others that 
are not as likely to be found in negotiating contracts. 
 
A problem that the negotiation model introduces, and the cooperation model more directly confronts, is that the 
negotiations may foster closer relations between government officials and the contractors, sometimes producing 
a less objective consideration of the content of proposals and providing more opportunities for contract officers 
to promote the needs and interests of the private agent (Cooper, 1980; Hunt, 1984). In this way, the precise "fit" 
of the services of the community or client group may not be quite what would be found in the more explicit 
proposal process of the competition model. 
 
This approach is also more likely than the previous model to allow for political awards, since elected officials or 
high-level appointees can more readily violate the usual rules and practices of the contracting system (Cooper, 
1980). In my 1984 study of Michigan social and employment services, for example, some contracting decisions 
were made on political grounds to reward certain friends and allies or in response to pressures from strong 
interest groups. Even when the government program managers no longer valued the services or their results, 
given contractor performance and fiscal strain, these contracts were difficult to terminate or reduce. 
Consequently, the benefits of lower cost and better quality services via service contracting may not occur where 
politically motivated decisions are frequent. 
 
THE COOPERATION MODEL 
The cooperation model is likely to be a viable alternative to the previous models under the following 
environmental and organizational conditions: (a) where there are low resources of time, funding, or existing 
suppliers prepared to produce the service; (b) little government expertise and/or experience in delivering a 
service; and (c) rapid rate of change and/or a high level of uncertainty and complexity about future events, 
funding, technology, or successful service methods (Williamson, 1975). While all of these conditions may not 
need to be present to make the cooperation approach the most attractive alternative, it is likely that the 
confluence of several of these conditions will mean that the two previous models are less appropriate than the 
cooperative model. Many government programs currently operate under a variety of these constraints; therefore, 
the cooperative approach may be one that is more appropriate to their circumstances. 
 
The Operation of the Cooperation Model 
In this model, the service environment is typically characterized by only one contractor. If there are more, high 
capital investment or market entry costs encourage the selected supplier and government officials to agree at 
least informally that the contract will continue to be renewed on a sole source purchase basis. Not only are 
meaningful alternatives unavailable in the private sector, but there are also limited opportunities for the 
government to produce the service itself, due to insufficient capital outlay funds, political commitment, legal 
restrictions, or lack of expertise. Such circumstances emphasize incentives for firms to establish a long-term 
relationship with the government agency and thus continue to receive future contracts. This approach is likely to 
be used where multiyear contracts are in place, as in certain capital projects or consulting, research, and 
development services. The contractor becomes a sole source supplier and a monopolist. (For some services, the 
government may be the only buyer in the market, thus establishing a bilateral monopoly as well.) Only in the 
most unusual circumstances would it be possible that another contractor would be encouraged to enter the 
contracting process—and then only if the government's needs were redefined or the current supplier proved to 
be grossly inefficient, unreliable, or unresponsive to public agency demands. 
 
In this relationship, the government and the contractor are relatively equal partners. Although the initial bidding 
or contract award process that led to the selection of the contractor may have been conducted according to the 
competition or negotiation model, program management and future contract renewal sessions will be 
cooperative in nature. The system is quite decentralized and flexible, with discretion about many contracting 
decisions in the hands of program managers who often develop a personal relationship with the contractor. Both 
sides will share information, since each has incentives to make adjustments and improvements as necessary. 
The contractor becomes a key actor in providing needs assessments, planning programs, and determining the 
methods and levels of service delivery. Both sides will try to anticipate implementation problems, yet knowing 
that they cannot write all possible contingencies into the contract. Throughout the life of the contract, 
monitoring officials may be less inclined to enforce the contract according to the letter of the agreement and 
more likely to assist contractors in improving their performance and overcoming obstacles. Thus fine-tuning 
administrative and service delivery systems is an ongoing priority for both sides. In sum, they will emphasize 
the program or services, clients, and outcomes in place of the proper process, procedures, and paperwork. 
 
The contract itself will not be particularly detailed or specific; rather, it will be a flexible document. This is not 
only because of uncertainty, complexity, a rapid rate of change, or insufficient time and resources to enumerate 
all contingencies but also because of the trust that develops with a reliable contractor. Implicitly, at least, this 
model assumes a willingness to comply with the terms of the agreement, to avoid situations and behaviors that 
would damage cooperation, and to work to improve services. Neither side wishes to upset the balance of 
cooperation, since by establishing an ongoing agreement, both sides can reduce their level of uncertainty in an 
uncertain organizational, political, fiscal, technical, or service environment. 
 
The substitute for a tight contract that embodies notions of legal accountability is a set of common professional 
standards that act to limit opportunistic behavior. Firms or agencies are awarded contracts only if they have an 
established reputation for quality services and ethical practices. During the life of the contract, the professionals 
on both sides of the contract relationship are afforded a great deal of discretion, since they have the skills and 
expertise necessary to make appropriate choices in technically complex and uncertain areas. As an analysis of 
the space shuttle Challenger tragedy suggests, professional controls internalized by contracting participants may 
be very effective in ensuring quality programs and may, indeed, be superior under some circumstances to more 
traditional legal and bureaucratic mechanisms of accountability (Romzek & Dubnick, 1986). 
 
As the general literature on cooperation suggests, cooperative behaviors are not entirely prompted by the 
situation nor motivated by altruism and commitment to professional standards, the government agency, and/ or 
the public interest, of course (Axelrod, 1984). Some systems may allow for profit or fee payments to be decided 
by the government officials, based on the contractor's performance—not on predetermined quantitative 
measures in the contract (Hunt, 1985). This opportunity for managerial discretion and judgment clearly 
encourages the contractor to please government associates through cooperation. In addition, contractors will 
attempt to preserve stable, cooperative relationships with the government because it is in their long-term self-
interest. As Scholz (1984) suggested in the regulatory context, such a strategy helps both sides "to achieve 
higher utility in the long run by abstaining from temptations to maximize short-term gains" (p. 220). Though 
discussing cooperation when government authority is absent, Axelrod (1984) made a key point which is 
applicable to contracting as well: "What makes it possible for cooperation to emerge is the fact that the players 
might meet again" (p. 12). 
 
In actuality, the cooperation model may not be an approach that all officials would want to develop when they 
first decide to contract out for a service. Rather, this approach often develops from having had several years of a 
satisfactory negotiating relationship with a particular contractor. In addition, federal, state, or local laws or 
regulations may prohibit the use of this model. In the study of mental health contracting in Massachusetts, for 
example, competitive bidding has been required both for all new services and for renewals of contracts every 
three years (Schlesinger et al., 1986). 
 
Examples of the cooperation model in practice have been found in several human services areas. In their review 
of purchase of social services contracting in the I970s Kettner and Martin (1986) went so far as to claim that the 
cooperation model (or partnership model, as they called it) was the standard approach until recently. As I 
mentioned in an earlier work (DeHoog, 1984), in two Michigan counties, social service decisions were made 
cooperatively with community agencies that, in concert, were very influential in selecting service priorities and 
contracts (p. 83). In one county, private agency representatives met monthly with county officials to discuss 
service needs and program changes. Their suggestions strongly influenced the decisions of the county 
department which prided itself in having a highly cooperative working relationship with private providers. 
Paperwork requirements were more flexible than in other counties, contractors were assured of contract 
renewals, and public officials were very sympathetic to private agency concerns. Contract choices were shaped 
by professional norms, notions of fairness, and client needs. Schlesinger et al. (1986) referred to the mental 
health partnership clinics in Massachusetts that were common in the 1950s and 1960s, in which satisfactory 
cooperative relationships were established in a joint public-private system of service delivery without 
competitive and negotiation requirements. 
 
Hunt's (I985) description of cooperative contracting for R&D in the Department of Defense emphasized a 
current movement toward cooperation under conditions of little (if any) competition and high uncertainty and 
complexity. The J-model, or joint government-contractor effort, includes the use of the award fee contract as a 
flexible approach to improving the process and performance of contracting. This award fee approach allows 
government managers to be actively involved in program implementation and to reward contractors with fees 
based on managers' judgments about performance. In evaluating award fee contracting in the Air Force Systems 
Command, Hunt found that it fostered positive, cooperative relationships, as well as flexibility by government 
managers in influencing their contracted programs. 
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Cooperation Model 
Probably the primary advantage of this model is its emphasis on performance and program management. This 
model provides for a flexible contracting system that is adaptive to change and uncertainty without the 
constraint of artificial deadlines, unrealistic contract provisions, or complex procedures. When problems arise, 
decisions can be tailor-made according to the circumstances of the situation and the contractor—both during the 
planning (contract writing) stage and during the implementation phase of the contract. A second advantage of 
cooperative contracting is that the system makes full use of the service deliverers' knowledge of the service and 
clients and recognizes that contractors often have better information and more professional expertise than the 
government does. The reliance on professional performance standards can be powerful, internalized controls on 
opportunistic behavior. 
 
Third, contracting under this model may actually limit opportunistic behavior in another way, that is, with no 
real competitors, there are few incentives for opportunistic behavior to receive a contract or to obtain renewals. 
Continuous personal interactions may also put more informal and professional pressures on contractors to 
perform well and comply with agency requests as they recognize their mutual interdependence. Fourth, the 
long-term relationship avoids the various transaction costs involved in seeking out and changing contractors. It 
makes the communication and translation of government requirements in the language of the contractor quite 
easy, since a common language is developed over time and may, in fact, be embedded in common professional 
training. Therefore, little time and effort is expended in correcting communication difficulties or technical, 
administrative, or service delivery problems. 
 
Although these advantages represent important ways in which cooperative contracting may be preferable to the 
other alternatives (given the stated environmental and organization conditions), several dangers are inherent in 
using this model. First, the cooperative system is likely to be a fairly closed process among similar kinds of 
professionals who may lack objectivity and an overall view of the program. This approach emphasizes 
professional discretion with few systematic control mechanisms. Since other service alternatives are unlikely to 
exist, it may promote a tolerance for errors and problems in the contractor's administrative operation and 
services. After all, the government has a great deal invested in the single agency or firm. Because of the 
attendant climate of trust, the lack of specificity in the contract, and the complexities of the service, the costs of 
monitoring and evaluating services may well be somewhat lower or, at least, government officials may be less 
motivated to adhere strictly to the usual control and evaluative mechanisms. In fact, where resources for 
thorough evaluations are severely constrained, government officials may rely on the contractor's evaluations of 
their own services, as was found frequently in my (1984) study of human services. If external or hierarchical 
controls are introduced in a cooperative process, resentment and resistance are quite likely to result on the part 
of both the contractors and the government monitors, who are usually quite contented with the more informal 
system that they have developed. A case illustrating this point is the Challenger project, in which the 
professional aeronautics engineers at both NASA and its contractors chafed under the adoption and application 
of new and stricter forms of political and bureaucratic oversight (Romzek & Dubnick, 1986). 
 
Second, and related to this issue, is the possible problem of familiarity breeding complacency when there is no 
realistic threat of losing a contract. Maintaining friendly, cooperative personal relationships may become more 
important to participants than providing high-quality services for the public. Thus threats to promoting efficient 
and equitable service delivery in the public interest represent the most serious drawback of this model. 
 
Third, the contracting approach may tempt suppliers to control or manipulate information in the development of 
the contract when they have a significant informational advantage over the government officials. Without an 
independent verification of information, the government may make unwise choices that have negative fiscal and 
service outcomes. Consequently, the success of the cooperative system is heavily dependent on the values, 
skills, and knowledge of the contract officers. Because of their discretion and their continuing relationships with 
the contractors, they may become advocates for and defenders of "their" contractors and contracts. This 
behavior may be especially likely when public officials have private sector opportunities for future 
employment, as the Department of Defense cases suggest (Hunt, 1984). 
 
Where this model is used, public managers must be creative and wise in their efforts to provide incentives for 
administrative compliance, service improvements, and cost containment. Bonuses or increased funding can be 
useful inducements to contractors (Hunt, 1985). In addition, upper-level managers and lateral control staffs 
must be able to oversee the process and intervene, if necessary, where cooperative models are used, to avoid 
potential abuses of the system. Officials may also consider developing an external evaluation process or a 
citizen advisory group to act as more objective third parties reviewing the cooperative contract arrangement. 
 
Finally, gaining political and administrative acceptance for this approach may be more difficult than for the two 
previous models, even if the model would operate in an ideal fashion. From an outsider's viewpoint or from the 
traditional managerial perspective, these relationships can be seen as emphasizing collusion and co-optation as 
much as cooperation and coordination (Cooper, 1980; DeHoog, 1984; Hunt, 1984). Thus those who do not 
recognize the benefits of this system or object to outside provision of public services may criticize this approach 
much more than the competition model, whose benefits are more widely understood. In addition, a cooperative 
system can be used inappropriately, either as a guise for politically motivated contract decisions or when 
administrators wish to avoid the transaction costs of competitive bidding. The cooperative approach may have 
real appeal to some decision makers under these circumstances, even though greater efficiencies could be 
realized with either the competition or negotiation approaches. 
 
DISCUSSION 
This article has addressed the need to understand more about the structure, process, and conditions of 
contracting for services. The models outlined here clarify how the contracting system can be designed and 
implemented in three ways under different sets of conditions: the availability of suppliers, organizational 
resources, and service production certainty. We have seen that only under certain conditions is competitive 
contracting likely to be effectively implemented. The cooperation model suggests a different approach to con-
tracting that may flourish under conditions of few suppliers, limited organizational resources, and high 
uncertainty. The negotiation model lies somewhere on the continuum between the competition and cooperation 
models, since it includes elements of each in its operation. While I have indicated how the three different 
models operate in contracting, it must be recognized that in reality, the distinctions between these models are 
often blurred. 
 
In sum, the decision processes of the two alternative contracting models differ considerably from that posited by 
the traditional competitive model of contracting. While the design of the competitive bidding system 
emphasizes an optimization strategy in seeking and choosing among suppliers, the negotiation and the 
cooperation designs are more oriented toward an incremental approach in the Simon (1976) tradition. In other 
words, given a small number of potential suppliers, limited resources, and a high degree of uncertainty and/or 
complexity, officials are likely to use dependable routines, familiar suppliers, and sequential search patterns to 
find the contractor and services that meet the government agency's needs. Face-to-face, relational contracting 
characterizes both the negotiation and the cooperation approaches, while the competition model relies on the 
formal process of soliciting, awarding, and administering contracts. The competition model emphasizes the 
traditional bureaucratic control mechanisms; the cooperation model (and, to a lesser extent, the negotiation 
model) is based more on professional norms and standards of performance and accountability. As a result of 
their differing decision processes and control mechanisms, each of these three models has various advantages 
and disadvantages that must be carefully understood when officials adopt or evaluate service contracting.
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All of this leaves us with an important question: When the conditions required for effective implementation of 
the competition model of contracting are absent, why contract out? Given the limitation of the competition 
model, should not the government bureaucracy internalize service supply? 
 
Several considerations enter into answering these questions. First, it may indeed be more efficient to use public 
employees. The approach developed here does not intend to imply that in all cases contracting out is a better 
method of service delivery. The fiscal and service outcomes of any service delivery arrangement are influenced 
by the design of the process itself and are contingent on both external and internal conditions. Analysts need to 
consider whether government agencies themselves might indeed be better service producers. However, the 
second answer to the question is that it may not be politically, fiscally, or organizationally feasible to use 
internal supply. State laws, federal regulations, or ideological preferences for using the private sector may 
explain why privatization is used, even when it cannot be defended on efficiency grounds. And third, the 
government agency may not always wish to maximize efficiency but may be interested in other goals and 
objectives, including client rights, public participation, and/or a set of contractors that represent various client or 
service interests (Morgan & England, 1988). For example, Murin (1985) argued that purchasing services can 
also be used to maximize service equity, not only to cut costs or improve efficiency. 
 
Finally, the two alternative models of contracting are not necessarily inefficient, inequitable, or unresponsive 
(Williamson, 1985). Rather, in the long run, if used correctly and appropriately, they can produce services and 
projects which meet public needs at reasonable costs. As we have seen, the cooperation and negotiation models 
of contracting are adaptations to very real environmental, organizational, and service constraints. Inflexible use 
of the competition model under such conditions may lead to very real declines in the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public services. Efficiency and service goals will best be achieved when the design of the 
contracting process is adapted to the number of suppliers, organizational limitations, and the level of 
uncertainty. No one model is superior to the others. Only by considering the contracting conditions and services 
can an appropriate model be chosen. 
 
NOTES 
1. This may not necessarily be a realistic assumption in some areas where managers may have mixed 
motives or where elected officials and bureaucrats involved in contract decisions may have different 
incentive structures. 
2. In the competition model, the sealed bid usually is the ideal—the seller's offer is limited to a piece of 
paper submitted anonymously in response to the buyer's public announcement. In some local 
governments, least-cost requirements make the process even more formal, with virtually no discretion 
allowed by government contract officers. This, of course, has the advantage of ensuring fairness, 
limiting political influence, and providing for an open and objective system. However, it may also mean 
that in the case of inexperienced suppliers, the contract will require greater amounts of technical 
assistance (both administrative and service-related) from local public administrators and will likely 
encounter start-up and implementation problems. Most contracts in the competition model are firm, 
fixed-price contracts (FFP), although incentive and performance contracting are coming into vogue, 
despite the difficulty in administering them. In addition, the contracts are often for a 1-year period, in 
large part to both reduce the risk for the government in the face of inadequate performance and provide 
an incentive for contractors to continue good service delivery. 
3. Suboptimal outcomes are more likely to occur when the purchasing agency holds monopsony or 
oligopsony power, as is the case in many public services. If there are no private sector buyers of the 
service, receiving contracts from just a few government units will mean the difference between survival 
and failure. Thus small-numbers supply is even more likely under monopsony or oligopsony conditions 
and may well produce monopolies in the long run. A large number of suppliers is not strictly necessary 
to produce competition if new competitors might easily enter the market. However, in many service 
areas, where market failures may have led to public provision of services in the first place, barriers to 
market entry are quite common. For example, DeHoog (1984, pp. 54-70) explained that the pool of 
social and employment agencies often is very small because historically few agencies offered services 
for the poor. 
4. In addition to the failure to meet the conditions just described, this model is not a particularly flexible 
approach to contracting, since if the contractor fails to comply with any of the terms of either the IFB or 
RFP or the contract, the firm's bid will not be considered (Cooper, 1980). Thus a strong emphasis is 
placed on being responsive to the specifications in submitting a proposal (creative deviations not 
permitted) and being responsible in carrying out the terms of the contract as specified. 
5. Participants in government contracting are likely to have some preferences about these approaches to 
contracting systems (DeHoog, 1986). Government attorneys, central procurement officers, and other 
oversight officials often prefer the clarity and legal controls in the competition model. On the other 
hand, program mangers in the social and human services often desire the flexibility and control offered 
by the negotiation model. Those who have had contracts in the past may favor the cooperation approach 
since it offers opportunities for more contractor input and participation and may ensure future stability. 
However, aspiring contractors would be more likely to prefer the more open and competitive system in 
hopes of obtaining public contracts. Indeed, as Ferris and Graddy (1986) suggested, the models may 
imply that a particular sector is likely to be preferred—that is, the private, for-profit sector for the 
competition model, the nonprofit sector for the negotiation model, and either the nonprofit or public 
sector for the cooperation model. 
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